Emergence of norovirus GI.2 outbreaks in military camps in Singapore  by Ho, Zheng Jie Marc et al.
International Journal of Infectious Diseases 31 (2015) 23–30Emergence of norovirus GI.2 outbreaks in military camps in Singapore
Zheng Jie Marc Ho a,b,*, Gunalan Vithia c, Ching Ging Ng d, Sebastian Maurer-Stroh c,e,f,
Clive M. Tan a, Jimmy Loh d, Tzer Pin Raymond Lin f, Jian Ming Vernon Lee a,b
aHQ Medical Corps, Singapore Armed Forces, 701 Transit Road #04-01, Singapore 778910
bMinistry of Health, Singapore
cBioinformatics Institute, A*STAR Singapore, Singapore
dDSO National Laboratories, Singapore
e School of Biological Sciences, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore
fNational Public Health Laboratory, College of Medicine, Singapore
A R T I C L E I N F O
Article history:
Received 11 October 2014
Received in revised form 6 December 2014
Accepted 11 December 2014
Corresponding Editor: Eskild Petersen,
Aarhus, Denmark
Keywords:
Disease outbreaks
Norovirus
Military personnel
Epidemiology
S U M M A R Y
Background: Simultaneous acute gastroenteritis (AGE) outbreaks occurred at two military camps. This
study details the epidemiological ﬁndings, explores possible origins, and discusses preventive measures.
Methods: Investigations included attack rate surveys, symptom surveys, hygiene inspections, and the
testing of water, food, and stool samples. DNA/RNA was extracted from stool samples and ampliﬁed via
real-time reverse transcription PCR (RT-PCR). Partial and full-length capsid nucleotide sequences were
obtained, phylogenetic relationships inferred, and homology modelling of antigenic sites performed.
Results: The military outbreaks involved 775 persons and were preceded by two AGE outbreaks at
restaurants in the local community. The outbreak was longer and larger in the bigger camp (21 days,
attack rate 15.0%) than the smaller camp (6 days, attack rate 8.3%). Of 198 stool samples, norovirus GI.2
was detected in 32.5% (larger camp) and 28.6% (smaller camp). These were essentially identical to
preceding community outbreaks. Antigenic site homology modelling also showed differences between
identiﬁed and more common AGE outbreak strains (norovirus GII.4).
Conclusion: Differences observed highlight difﬁculties in controlling person-to-person outbreaks among
large groups in close proximity (e.g., military trainees). Distinct differences in antigenic sites may have
contributed to increased immunological susceptibility of the soldiers to infection.
 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of International Society for Infectious Diseases.
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-
nc-nd/4.0/).
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jou r nal h o mep ag e: w ww .e lsev ier . co m / loc ate / i j id1. Introduction
Norovirus is the most common cause of acute gastroenteritis
(AGE) outbreaks globally.1 A single-stranded positive-sense RNA
virus of the Caliciviridae family, norovirus is divided into ﬁve
genogroups, three of which (GI, GII, and GIV) are known to cause
disease in humans.2 Of the more than 25 genotypes, GII.4 is most
commonly implicated as the cause of AGE outbreaks.3
The resilience and persistence of norovirus in the environment
allows for its spread through a wide range of common and
unexpected infective sources.4,5 It also spreads rapidly in close
communities, causing high attack rates in nursing homes, childcare
centres, and cruise ships. As such, efforts to contain its spread need
to be meticulous for success.6 Norovirus is also a challenge to the* Corresponding author. Tel.: +65 94799697; fax: +65 62260139.
E-mail address: marchozj@gmail.com (Z.J.M. Ho).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijid.2014.12.023
1201-9712/ 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of International So
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).military. Unique operational environments, such as an increased
population density, result in the easy spread of norovirus within
military populations, and large outbreaks have been documented
previously across the world.7–9
In September 2013, simultaneous AGE outbreaks occurred at
two military camps in Singapore, involving a total of 775 persons.
This study aimed to determine the epidemiology of the outbreaks,
investigate its origins (including the use of phylogenetic studies
and structural modelling), and discuss measures to prevent future
occurrences.
2. Methods
2.1. Epidemiology
Singapore is a tropical city-state in Southeast Asia, and a global
travel and trade hub with large numbers of travellers entering theciety for Infectious Diseases. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
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who ﬁnish high school or equivalent are enlisted for 2 years.
Soldiers typically reside in military camps during the working
week and return home on weekends if there are no military
activities. This results in constant interactions between military
personnel and the general community in Singapore.
Primary healthcare for military personnel is provided by clinics
within the military camps, which also serve as on-site surveillance
for infectious diseases. In the Singapore military, AGE is deﬁned as
the rapid onset of two or more episodes of vomiting and/or three or
more episodes of diarrhoea. A cluster of 10 or more cases meeting
these criteria across 24 h (linked either by space or a common food
source) constitutes an outbreak. It is mandatory for doctors to
inform the military system’s epidemiology department when an
outbreak is suspected.
On September 24, two military camps reported suspected AGE
outbreaks. Epidemiology teams were sent to conduct investiga-
tions and implement control measures. Routine outbreak inves-
tigations included attack rate surveys for food consumed 2 days
prior to the ﬁrst symptoms, symptom surveys, hygiene inspec-
tions, and the testing of water, food, and stool samples. Water
samples were obtained from common water sources at food halls
and accommodation areas of the affected soldiers. Food samples, if
available, were obtained from the food hall (these were stored
routinely in freezers for 2 days immediately after cooking for
future testing if required) and sent for culture and testing. Stool
samples of cases and food handlers were sent for PCR testing.
The number of soldiers reporting sick with AGE was monitored
daily by the camp clinic. Control measures were centred on the
escalation of personal and environmental hygiene. These included
the separation of affected and unaffected soldiers, enforcement of
hand-washing and hygiene, ensuring food and water safety, and
disinfection of communal areas with sodium hypochlorite.
We describe herein the epidemiological curve, symptoms
experienced by the affected soldiers, and results of food, water,
and stool tests.
2.2. Sample preparation, nucleic acid extraction, and diagnostic tests
DNA/RNA extraction from stool samples was performed as
described previously by Loh et al.10 A previous work demonstrated
that the same procedure was able to isolate total nucleic acid
including viral RNA from stool as well.11 The assays used for eight
bacterial pathogens were a mix of those developed in-house and
published assays modiﬁed into multiplex PCRs and validated with
test panels from various external quality assessment providers.
The real-time reverse transcription PCR (RT-PCR) to detect
norovirus followed a protocol developed by Jothikumar et al.12
2.3. RT-PCR ampliﬁcation of the full length ORF2 region of norovirus
Reverse transcription was performed by ﬁrst incubating 8 ml of
RNA template with 1 mM of each deoxynucleoside triphosphate
(dNTP; dATP, dCTP, dGTP, dTTP) and 5 mM oligo(dT)20 primer
(Invitrogen) at 65 8C for 5 min in a 10-ml reaction, followed by
rapid cooling on ice. The resultant solution was added to a 10-ml
reaction mixture containing a ﬁnal concentration of 1 reverse
transcription buffer (Invitrogen), 10 mM dithiothreitol (DTT),
5 mM MgCl2, 2 U RNaseOUT (Invitrogen), and 200 U of SuperScript
III reverse transcriptase, and incubated for 50 min at 50 8C. Reverse
transcription was terminated by increasing the temperature to
85 8C for 5 min.
The primer set G1SKF (50-CTG CCC GAA TTY GTA AAT GA-30 0)
and CapA (50- GGC WGT TCC CAC AGG CTT-30 0) was used to amplify
the full-length ORF2 region (about 1700 bp) of the norovirus
detected in the outbreak samples.13,14 The PCRs were performedwith 3 ml added to 27 ml of a PCR mixture with (ﬁnal concentra-
tions) 20 mM Tris–HCl (pH 8.4), 50 mM KCl, 2 mM MgCl2, 100 mM
each dNTP, 0.33 mM each primer, and 1.5 U Taq polymerase
(Invitrogen). The PCR was carried out at 95 8C for 5 min, followed
by 40 cycles of 95 8C, 48 8C, and 72 8C for 30 s, 1 min, and 2 min,
respectively, and then a ﬁnal elongation step at 72 8C for 7 min.
Five microlitres of PCR product was electrophoresed on 1% agarose
in 0.5 TBE (Tris–borate–EDTA) buffer and visualized by Midori
Green staining. The remaining PCR was sent for Sanger sequencing.
2.4. Phylogenetic analysis of capsid sequences
Partial and full-length capsid nucleotide sequences were
obtained from (1) community isolates from the National Public
Health Laboratory, Ministry of Health, Singapore, (2) closest BLAST
hits (99% identity) from Asia and outside Asia,15 and (3) GII
norovirus sequences from a recent study in Singapore from
Genbank.16 CD-HIT was used to cluster reference sequences based
on 98% identity and these were aligned to community isolates and
outbreak samples in MAFFT,17 using the E-INS-i algorithm in two
steps; aligned full-length sequences were used as a seed alignment
for the addition of shorter sequences from community and military
outbreaks.18 Phylogenetic relationships were inferred using the
maximum likelihood method based on the Tamura–Nei model.19
Initial tree(s) for the heuristic search were obtained by applying
the neighbour-joining and Bio-NJ methods to a matrix of pairwise
distances estimated using the maximum composite likelihood
(MCL) approach, and bootstrapped 1000 times. The analysis
involved 30 nucleotide sequences; positions containing gaps and
missing data were eliminated to yield 112 positions in the ﬁnal
dataset. Evolutionary analyses were conducted in MEGA6.20
2.5. Antigenic site modelling
Representative dimeric structural models for GI.2 and GII.4
capsid proteins were derived using an existing crystal structure of
the Norwalk virus capsid protein as a structural template21 and a
full-length capsid sequence from the outbreak isolates,
GI.2_Camp2_467, as well as a full-length GII.4 reference sequence,
Hu/GII.4/New Orleans1805/2009/USA (gi:576106129), as target
sequences.
Homology modelling was performed using a custom auto-
modeller script based on the MODELLER engine with ﬁve
rudimentary models generated and loop reﬁnement performed
on each model.22 The best model for each target sequence was
selected on the basis of DOPE quality scores.23 Resulting models
were structurally aligned in YASARA Structure using the MUSTANG
algorithm, and structural and antigenic site comparison was
performed.24 Residue numbering of the GI.2 isolate was changed to
GII.4 numbering in order to perform an accurate comparison of
antigenic sites.
Informed consent was not required as this was an operational
outbreak investigation, in line with institutional policy governing
medical research. The use of the data and publication was
approved by the Singapore Armed Forces Joint Medical Committee
for Research.
3. Results
3.1. Camps and soldiers involved
Camp 1 was a camp with approximately 5000 soldiers spread
across 21 groups, and camp 2 was a separate camp with about
700 soldiers spread across four groups. There were 150 to
250 soldiers in each group. A total of 720 soldiers from camp
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the outbreak period.
In both camps, there were communal facilities shared by
soldiers within a group (e.g., accommodation rooms and toilets),
some by groups in close proximity (e.g., common training facilities)
and some by all soldiers in the same camp (e.g., swimming pool).
No direct interactions between soldiers in camps 1 and 2 could be
identiﬁed prior to or during the AGE outbreak.
3.2. Community outbreaks
Over the weekend spanning September 14–15, two AGE
outbreaks at restaurants in the local community involving
69 people were conﬁrmed by the Ministry of Health, Singapore.
During that time, about 3000 soldiers from 13 groups (including
the index ‘group A’) in camp 1 and all soldiers from camp 2 were on
home leave, although no direct link between the soldiers and the
affected restaurants could be established.
3.3. Camp 1 outbreak
The outbreak epidemiological charts for camps 1 and 2 are
shown in Figure 1. A chart depicting interactions of camp 1 soldiers
affected during the ﬁrst three waves is shown in Figure 2.
3.3.1. Wave 1
The ﬁrst wave of AGE cases in camp 1 began on September 19,
with 25 people from group A reporting sick at the medical clinic
with AGE symptoms. At that time, group B, which usually had few
interactions with group A, was in the same clinic for routine
vaccinations.
3.3.2. Wave 2
Over the weekend of September 21–22, 13 groups returned
home (including group A) and three groups were training out of
camp. Of the ﬁve groups remaining in camp (1200 soldiers), groups
C, D, and E had multiple interactions with group B at the commonFigure 1. Epidemiological curve for camptraining ground, swimming pools, and dining areas (Figure 2).
Fifteen soldiers from group D began reporting sick with AGE on
September 22, followed by 96 soldiers across groups B, C, D, and E
on September 24. Soldiers in group F, having had few interactions
throughout, remained unaffected. The epidemiology department
was notiﬁed on September 24, and control measures were
promptly implemented.
3.3.3. Wave 3
The next wave of AGE cases began on September 26, involving
122 affected soldiers from six groups. The spread was likely
through common living, training, and dining areas (Figure 2). To
break chains of transmission in the closed setting, all soldiers
returned home over the weekend of September 28–29, with health
education reminders.
3.3.4. Plateau
On their return, an increased incidence of AGE cases was seen
scattered throughout most groups over the next 5 days
(September 30 to October 4), averaging 40 cases per day.
Instead of the large clusters seen during the ﬁrst three waves,
cases were evenly distributed. Although routine cleaning
principles including the use of chlorine bleach at 2500 ppm
(within the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
recommended range) had been performed, a decision was made
to strengthen the disinfection process, including increasing
the concentration of chlorine bleach used to 5000 ppm (upper
bound of the recommended range) for common touch points
potentially soiled with bodily ﬂuids. This occurred alongside a
stepping up of public education on the touch points that could
transmit disease.
3.3.5. Resolution
The number of soldiers reporting sick began to fall sharply from
October 9, with an average of 10 cases over the next 3 days. By the
following week, AGE cases in camp 1 had returned to baseline. No
further waves were observed.s 1 and 2 (by date of reporting sick).
Figure 2. Activity chart for affected groups in waves 1 to 3 in camp 1. The various affected groups are labelled A to I. Over the weekend of September 21–22, groups A, F, G, H,
and I were not in camp. The swimming pool and medical centre were common areas shared by all groups, whereas the training grounds and dining areas were only shared by a
subset.
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The outbreak at camp 2 was smaller and resolved within 6 days.
3.4.1. Waves 1 and 2
The ﬁrst wave in camp 2 began at the same time as that in camp
1, involving 17 soldiers reporting sick with AGE symptoms from
September 19 to 20. This was followed by a second wave involving
28 soldiers on September 22 and 23. Likewise, once the
epidemiology department was notiﬁed, outbreak control measures
were instituted.
3.4.2. Resolution
Only sporadic AGE cases were seen thereafter. The last case was
seen on September 24 and no further waves were observed.
3.5. Symptoms of affected soldiers
A symptom survey was conducted among 49 affected soldiers
from camp 1 and 48 soldiers from camp 2; results are shown in
Table 1. The predominant symptoms varied between camps, with
more reports of diarrhoea in camp 2 (97.7% vs. 67.3%) and vomiting
in camp 1 (75.5% vs. 50.0%).Table 1
Distribution of symptoms in camps 1 and 2 from symptom surveys
Symptom Camp 1 (%)
(n = 49)
Camp 2 (%)
(n = 48)
Vomiting 75.5 50.0
Nausea 71.4 70.8
Diarrhoea 67.3 97.7
Abdominal pain 57.1 85.4
Fever 22.4 33.33.6. Tests and other investigations
Food hall inspections, vocational ﬁtness assessment of food
handlers, testing of piped water, and food surveys all returned
negative. Forty-eight hours of routinely stored food samples from
camp 1 were sent for pathogen testing, although norovirus was not
tested. One processed rice product returned positive for Bacillus
cereus, but few soldiers had consumed the item, thus it was not
likely related to the outbreak. Food samples from camp 2 had been
inadvertently discarded before testing.
3.7. Stool sample testing
A total of 198 stool samples from cases in camp 1 and seven
from camp 2 were tested, with 64 (32.3%) and two (28.6%),
respectively, returning positive for norovirus GI. Of the remaining
139 samples from both camps, four returned positive for norovirus
GII and the remaining 135 samples (65.2%) were undetermined.
Full results are shown in Table 2. Stool samples of food handlers
from both camps were also tested, returning undetermined. A
decrease in positivity of samples to norovirus GI with outbreak
resolution was also noted in camp 1. During the second wave, 16 of
the 19 stool samples (84.2%) returned positive. This fell to 33.7%
and 22.0% during the plateau and resolution phases, respectively.
From October 10, there were no further positives.
3.8. Genomic analysis of norovirus GI stool samples
3.8.1. Phylogenetic analysis of norovirus sequences
Representative sequences (98% identity) from military and
community (September 14–15) outbreaks and reference sets were
aligned (Supplementary Material, Figure S1), and the relationship
between these sequences represented as a phylogenetic tree
Table 2
Summary of stool testing results from affected cases
Pathogen Camp 1 Camp 2
Norovirus I 64 (32.3%) 2 (28.6%)
Clostridium perfringens 8 (4.0%) 1 (14.3%)
Escherichia coli 8 (4.0%) 0
Norovirus II 4 (2.0%) 0
Campylobacter jejuni 1a (0.5%) 0
Bacillus cereus 1 (0.5%) 0
Shigella sp 1 (0.5%) 0
Salmonella sp 0 0
Listeria monocytogenes 0 0
Vibrio spb 0 0
No pathogen detected 112 (56.6%) 4 (57.1%)
Total 198 7
a There was one case of two pathogens detected (Campylobacter and norovirus
II).
b Vibrio species tested were Vibrio parahaemolyticus, Vibrio vulniﬁcus, and
Vibrio cholerae.
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isolates were essentially identical to each other, as well as closely
related to the closest representative BLAST hits from Asia and some
from outside Asia on the basis of the sequenced regions;
representative traditional GII.4 clinical isolates (blue) were
phylogenetically distant.
No other GI genotypes aside from GI.2 were identiﬁed in the
analysis. GII samples were detected sporadically along the courseFigure 3. Phylogenetic relationship between norovirus isolates. The isolates from the ou
outbreaks (green), closest BLAST hits from Asia (teal), closest BLAST hits from outside Asia
inferred using the maximum likelihood method in MEGA6. One thousand bootstrap reof the outbreak. As this was unlikely the cause of the outbreak,
these were not sent for further genotype analysis.
3.8.2. Structural analysis of norovirus capsid antigenic regions
Given that the traditional outbreak strain in Singapore has been
of the GII.4 genotype,16 it is possible that antigenic differences
compared to the GI.2 outbreak isolates in this study might have
contributed to the observed pathogenesis in infected soldiers.
Previous studies have examined the antigenicity of the norovirus
capsid protein and identiﬁed speciﬁc regions of antigenicity.
Structural alignment of the capsid models shows differences
between the surface structures of the two models (Figure 4a and b),
particularly in the loop regions where these antigenic regions have
been shown to exist.16 Examination of all known antigenic sites
(Figure 4c) shows amino acid differences at multiple sites
including regions A and C that lie prominently exposed on top
of the molecule. This difference between the molecular surfaces at
antigenic sites to previous outbreak strains (GII.4) suggests
differences in antibody recognition, which may allow for unhin-
dered proliferation of the GI.2 virus until immunity to the new
strains builds up.
4. Discussion
Similar to other incidents in closed settings, the norovirus
outbreak in the Singapore military camps spread quickly and
widely due to communal living and training environments – atbreaks (red) were compared to community isolates from the period preceding the
 (maroon), and representative GII norovirus (blue). Phylogenetic relationships were
plicates were performed and the tree with the highest log likelihood is shown.
Figure 4. Comparison of antigenic sites between GII.4 and GI.2 representative capsid models. (a) Best-scoring models representative of the GI.2 capsid (blue) and the GII.4
capsid (red) were generated using the MODELLER program and overlaid in YASARA to highlight structural and sequence identity (yellow) and structural identity but different
amino acids (grey), as well as strong structural differences shown in the original surface colours of the models. (b) Antigenic site comparison between GI.2 and GII.4 capsid
proteins. The overlap between the molecular surfaces of GI.2 (blue) and GII.4 (orange) suggests differences in antigenic sites where putative antibodies might bind. A
summary of the residue differences at all known antigenic sites between the two capsid representations is shown in (c). Residue clusters forming epitope regions are denoted
above the table, from A to E.
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rates of 15.0% and 8.3% in camps 1 and 2, respectively, are
comparable to those of previously reported norovirus AGE
outbreaks in military settings, which have ranged from 10.4% to
12.4%.7,28 These attack rates are lower than those reported from
outbreaks in other closed settings, where the incidence has ranged
from 20% to 53%,29 especially in hospitals and cruise ships.
Population-level control measures at camp 1 were imple-
mented after 136 people across ﬁve groups had been affected
(wave 2), during which soldiers affected in the subsequent wave
were likely in the incubation period. The effects of mitigating
actions were therefore only effective after the subsequent wave
had abated. This highlights the need for improved AGE surveil-
lance systems to detect early signs of impending or evolving
outbreaks. Systems in use globally include internet-based passive
reporting systems,30 and syndromic surveillance from telephone
triage and pharmacy data.31 For example, CaliciNet, a national
norovirus outbreak surveillance network that uses electronically
submitted laboratory data, detected a new GII.4 variant in 2009,
which subsequently caused 60% of AGE outbreaks that winter.32
Such systems may have merits in closed settings, since they allow
for mitigation of local outbreaks through early action. The
Singapore military has since implemented sentinel surveillance
and laboratory testing of a proportion of daily AGE cases and
real-time recording of all AGE cases to identify outbreak
prodromes. Additional outbreak thresholds for camps are also
being modelled from historic baseline AGE rates, while automat-
ed surveillance via electronic medical record systems is being
developed. Such measures will help to identify future outbreaks
earlier.
The differences between the two AGE outbreaks highlight
difﬁculties in controlling person-to-person outbreaks among large
groups in close proximity (e.g., military trainees) once substantial
spread has taken place. Although both camps informed the
epidemiology department at the same time, camp 1 was a camp
with a larger base population and multiple shared facilities serving
as points of contact for the rapid transmission of disease. Soldiers
in camp 1 also presented with more vomiting, which may have led
to more efﬁcient propagation.33Although the transmission of norovirus between ﬁngers and
surfaces,34,35 and the efﬁcacy of chloride-based solutions in its
inactivation have been described previously, a strong evidence
base for most outbreak control recommendations remains
poor,36,37 with the exception of proper hand hygiene.38 Although
increased viral loads on high contact objects have been described,
there is no good evidence regarding the efﬁcacy of commonly used
disinfection methods on such surfaces. There is thus a need for
further studies on fomite transmission models and disinfection
optimization.
The genetic similarity between noroviruses from both commu-
nity and military outbreaks is reﬂective of the close interactions
between the local populace and the military in Singapore,
especially when signiﬁcant proportions of soldiers return home
regularly. Previous reports of similar spread involving other
diseases have been published, including a hepatitis A outbreak
in the US military linked to a childcare facility and an outbreak of
mumps among military personnel in Luxembourg.39,40 This also
emphasizes the value of close collaboration between the military
and community epidemiological elements.
There were concerns as to whether soldiers returning home
would become index cases for further cases of norovirus
gastroenteritis in the general community. To prevent this, soldiers
were reminded of the need to maintain personal hygiene. Rates of
diarrhoeal illness at government clinics in Singapore were
monitored and there were no signiﬁcant increases in incidence
during the immediate preceding or subsequent time periods.41
This further suggests that any secondary spread from the military
to the community was limited.
Finally, the two outbreaks described represent the ﬁrst
documented GI.2 outbreaks in Singapore. A study by Lim et al.
showed that all of the 37 documented national outbreaks from
2004 to 2011 were due to norovirus GII.16 This deviation from the
traditional outbreak-associated GII.4 strain may have resulted in a
greater proportion of soldiers being immunologically susceptible
to falling ill with AGE and contributing to the initial exponential
propagation. This is supported by the homology modelling, which
showed distinct differences in antigenic sites between GII.4 and
GI.2. Although much of the norovirus vaccine development has
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reminders of the outbreak potential of other emerging genotypes
as well.
There are limitations to this study. The number of soldiers
affected included baseline AGE disease cases that may not have
been directly related to the ongoing norovirus outbreak. A portion
of these may have been captured under the 11.5% of stool samples
positive for other pathogens. The contrary is also true – soldiers
who had sought medical consultations outside of the military
medical system during their off days were not captured, and milder
cases that did not fulﬁl the AGE criteria were not counted as part of
the outbreak. Furthermore, as we did not incorporate internal
ampliﬁcation controls in the PCR reactions, samples that did not
return positive could not be determined conclusively as ‘true’
negatives, regardless of the pathogen.
As a direct link between preceding community outbreaks and
the subsequent military outbreaks could not be identiﬁed, the
association between the two remains circumstantial and based on
the temporal chain of events. While the phylogenetic evidence
suggests that the community and subsequent military outbreaks
were linked in terms of a common novel circulating norovirus
lineage, the direction of transmission of the outbreak isolate could
not be ascertained. Furthermore, the isolate Hu/GI.2/Jingzhou/
2013401/CHN collected in April 2013 (Figure 3) is evidence that
this lineage had been circulating regionally, adding further
uncertainty to the actual source of transmission.
In conclusion, we have described the epidemiological and
phylogenetic characteristics of two concurrent norovirus GI.2
outbreaks in the Singapore military likely linked to preceding local
community outbreaks. Although both are semi-closed, communal
settings, differences in attack rates between the two indicate a
greater propensity for transmission within large camps with a high
population density and contained spaces. However, these settings
also provide opportunities to study transmission patterns, as well as
to develop improved surveillance systems and control measures.
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